Topic: Cuban Missile Crisis

Order Description • Explain the role of diplomacy and security in international politics • Analyze the role of military force in global affairs. • Examine the causes of war and how diplomacy can be used in crisis management. • Evaluate major threats to regional peace and stability. • Assess the role of non-Regional powers in Gulf security challenges The Cuban Missile Crisis, 1962 In May 1962, Nikita Khrushchev conceived a daring plan that might solve the vulnerability of Castro’s Cuba to US attack, compensate for the missile gap and give the Soviet Union more leverage over Berlin. The plan was to deploy secretly 40 Soviet nuclear-armed MRBMs and IRBMs in Cuba. With the missiles installed by November, Khrushchev would then dramatically announce their presence, presenting the United States Kennedy with a fait accompli. Rationale for missile deployment Khrushchev believed that by placing nuclear missiles on Cuba he could deter any further US moves to invade the island. A few missiles would thus allow the Soviet Union to maintain an otherwise isolated communist ally in the US sphere of influence. Indeed, Khrushchev claimed during the subsequent crisis (and in his memoirs) that defending Cuba and Castro’s government from US aggression lay behind his decision to send missiles. But this was not the sole reason. The Soviet Union did not need to use nuclear missiles to safeguard Cuba; a few battalions of Soviet troops stationed in Cuba would have been sufficient to deter the United States. Khrushchev chose nuclear weapons because because they would bring wider strategic benefits. Although the Soviet Union possessed few ICBMs, it did hold a substantial force of R-12 MRBMs and R-14 IRBMs. Based on Soviet soil, they could hit targets in Europe but not the United States. But by moving missiles to Cuba, Khrushchev would in effect turn IRBMs and MRBMs into ICBMs, able to hit the US mainland. It was a quick and cheap way to make up ground in the nuclear arms race. Such deployments were not unprecedented in the Cold War. Soviet IRBMs were briefly placed in East Germany in 1958, to reach targets in Britain and France, and, as we have seen, the United States had positioned Thor and Jupiter missiles in Italy, Britain and Turkey. Khrushchev may have been partly inspired by the Turkish example – if the United States could succeed in deploying nuclear missiles on his southern border, why could he not do the same in return? The Soviet leader later talked of giving the United States ‘a little of their own medicine’. Khrushchev also appears to have hoped to use this deployment to exert pressure regarding the status of Berlin. Certainly, he made plans in the summer of 1962 to push again for a German peace treaty, for the removal of Western troops and for the transformation of West Berlin into a ‘free city’. The plan was typically of the Soviet leader: it was audacious but poorly thought out. Given Soviet knowledge of the capabilities of the U2 spyplane, it should have been obvious the United States would discover the operation. Furthermore, Khrushchev completely misjudged the likely US reaction – no US president could afford the let the Soviet Union build a nuclear-missile base just 90 miles off the coast of Florida. Operation Anadyr During the summer of 1962, Operation Anadyr began, in secret. Hidden on Soviet ships, most of the missiles were sent out to Cuba and put into place. However, the plan soon began to go wrong. US U2 planes spotted the missiles being assembled in Cuba, and on 16 October 1962 Kennedy was informed of the fact of Soviet nuclear missiles on the island. The president immediately decided that the weapons had to be removed, and he secretly consulted the Executive Committee of the National Security Council (Ex Comm) on the best way to do this. Ex Comm came up with three options: bomb the missile sites, invade Cuba or impose a blockade on the island. Although US military chiefs favoured air strikes or invasion, Kennedy wisely ignored their advice and chose the least provocative option, a blockade. On 22 October he went on national television and publicly revealed for the first time the discovery of the missiles. He announced that the United States would blockade Cuba (he called this a ‘quarantine’) and demanded the removal of missiles already there, threatening ‘further action’ if they were not withdrawn. To back up this threat, the United States began preparing an invasion force for Cuba. The crisis appeared very dangerous, with the potential for direct clashes between Soviet and US forces. If the Soviet Union attempted to breach the blockade it might lead to a US–Soviet naval conflict. If Khrushchev refused to withdraw the existing missiles from Cuba, Kennedy might be forced to bomb or invade, which carried the danger of escalation up to full-scale nuclear war. US forces were placed on Defcon 3 alert status, and the Strategic Air Command (SAC) kept many of its bombers airborne, loaded with nuclear weapons and with prearranged targets, ready to attack the Soviet Union. Soviet nuclear forces went on high alert for the first time in their history, and the few R-7 ICBMs were readied with their flight control systems wired for strikes against New York, Washington and Chicago. The stakes were extremely high: millions could be killed in a few hours should either Kennedy or Khrushchev lose his nerve or make the wrong move. Crisis diplomacy At first it seemed that Khrushchev would not back down. He denounced the blockade and protested that the missiles were only in Cuba to protect the island. Soviet ships kept sailing towards the blockade zone. However, Khrushchev and the Soviet presidium were not willing to go to war over the issue of missiles in Cuba. The US fleet had naval supremacy around the island and there was little the Soviet Union could do in the way of conventional forces. Given the large US superiority in nuclear forces, any use of Soviet nuclear weapons could be suicidal. On 24 October, the Soviet ships halted on the edge of blockade zone. Two days later, Khrushchev sent a letter to Kennedy proposing a deal. He offered to remove the missiles from Cuba if Kennedy in turn promised that the United States would not invade Cuba. Khrushchev then sent Kennedy a second letter on 27 October. This time he said that he would remove the missiles from Cuba if Kennedy promised not to invade and removed the 15 Jupiter missiles from Turkey. The USSR had increased its demands. US policymakers were confused by the difference in the two letters. They speculated that Khrushchev might have been deposed by a hard-line faction in the Kremlin, which had sent the second letter. This was not the case; Khrushchev had simply changed mind – he was an impulsive person and he was trying to haggle for a better deal. On 27 October the world came close to nuclear war, because the US and Soviet leaders were losing control of events on the ground. Incidents caused by military units threatened to spark off a conflict. Soviet forces in Cuba, acting on their own initiative, shot down a U2 spyplane flying over the island. Fortunately – and despite pressure from the US military – Kennedy refused to retaliate. A confrontation also occurred between a Soviet submarine, which was armed with a nuclear-tipped torpedo, and a US destroyer. Averting disaster Against this febrile background, US and Soviet leaders quickly moved to end the crisis. On 27 October Kennedy sent a letter to Khrushchev promising that United States would not invade Cuba if the Soviets removed the missiles. This was the public, official offer: a non-invasion pledge over Cuba in return for the removal of missiles. He also sent his brother, Robert Kennedy, to speak privately with the Soviet ambassador in Washington. Robert Kennedy told the Ambassador that the United States would also remove the Jupiter missiles from Turkey, but this would be done secretly and must not be connected with a deal over Cuba. On 28 October Khrushchev publicly accepted the deal, and the crisis was essentially over. The Soviet missiles were removed from Cuba, and by March 1963 the Jupiter missiles had also been withdrawn from Turkey. Castro remained in power, now free from the threat of US invasion. In two respects, Khrushchev appeared to have achieved his goals, despite the risks.